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Primal Spirituality and the Onto/Phylo Fallacy:
A Critique of the Claim that Primal Peoples Were/Are Less
Spiritually and Socially Developed Than Modern Humans
Steven Taylor
City College Manchester, England
Many theorists—including Freud, Habermas and Wilber—have suggested that there are strong
parallels between ontogeny and phylogeny, and that the development of the human species has
followed the same basic pattern as the development of the individual from birth to adulthood. I
discuss this view in relation to archaeological and anthropological knowledge of the world’s “primal peoples.” I look at the spiritual, moral, and social development of primal peoples and find
that, in almost every instance, they are more advanced than these theorists suggest, possessing
characteristics which only occur—ontogenetically—at the higher “fulcrums” of development. I
argue that Wilber’s spectrum model cannot be applied to species development and suggest the
basis of a new (non-ontogenetic) model of phylogeny.

T

he question of whether the world’s “primal
peoples”—both those who existed during earlier epochs and those who existed until recent
times—are genuinely “spiritual” or not is a hotly contested issue, which has important consequences for
transpersonal psychology. The two sides of the argument will be familiar to every reader of Ken Wilber’s
works. On the one hand there is what Wilber calls the
“Retro-romantic” view, which holds that primal peoples were more “spiritual” than modern human beings.
They possessed a strong sense of connection to the cosmos
and an awareness of esoteric forces and phenomena,
both of which we have lost. With the development of
our powerful intellect and strong sense of ego—and
especially with the development of modern industrial
civilisation—we “fell” away from their higher state of
being.
But according to Wilber (e.g., 1995), this is to fall
victim to the pre/trans fallacy. Applying his spectrum
of consciousness model to phylogenetic development,
Wilber argues that primal peoples were at a pre-personal level of consciousness. The hunter-gatherers of
the Paleolithic Era belonged to what he calls the
typhonic stage of evolution, which is characterised by
“magical thinking,” including voodoo practices,
taboos, and an animistic worldview. The farmers of the
Neolithic era, beginning around 10,000 BCE,

belonged to the mythic stage, where individuals began
to realise that magic no longer works and instead projected the existence of elaborate systems of gods,
demons, and other forces. At around 2500 BCE the
“solar ego stage” began, with the “low egoic” phase
lasting until 500 BCE when the current “high ego”
began. Only at this stage did human beings become
capable of rationality and hypothetico-deductive reasoning; and only at this stage did human beings
become capable of experiencing the higher transpersonal levels, including nirvikalpa samadhi itself. Every
age has an “average” level of consciousness, and some
gifted individuals are able to “jump” from that level to
the higher realms, but because their average level was
relatively low, earlier human beings could not leap the
full height of the spectrum. Even during the mythic
stage individuals could only “peak” at the psychic
realms, which they attained with the help of shamanic
rituals and trances (Wilber, 1981, 1995). Recently,
however, Wilber (2000a) has modified this view, and
now suggests that “a truly developed shaman in a magical culture, having evolved various postconventional
capacities, would be able to authentically experience
the transpersonal realms (mostly the psychic, but also, on
occasion, subtle and perhaps causal)” (p. 146, my italics).
In other words, according to Wilber, primal peoples are actually less spiritual than we, both in the
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sense that their average level of consciousness was
lower than ours—and therefore further away from the
transpersonal spiritual realms—and in the sense that
their exceptionally developed individuals could not
“leap” as high as we can (or at least far fewer of them
were capable of doing so). One of the problems here,
Wilber warns us, is that the lower levels of consciousness have superficial similarities with the highest levels.
At fulcrum-2, for example, (during the typhonic
stage), the individual experiences a state of pre-personal
fusion with the world, which is superficially similar to
the transpersonal state of oneness that highly developed mystics experience. This pre/trans fallacy is so
prevalent, Wilber argues, that we have developed a
completely romanticised view of our earlier human
cultures. We believe that there was once a golden age
(or at least a more golden age) when human beings
lived at one with each other and with nature, when
there was no war, oppression, selfishness, or environmental destruction. But Wilber takes exactly the
reverse view: rather than seeing human history as
being shaped by a Fall away from an earlier more pristine condition, he sees human history as a series of
“leaps”—or a slow progressive forward movement—
propelled by the atman telos of evolution (Wilber,
1981). He contends that, like young children, earlier
human beings were at the pre-operational stage of cognitive development and a pre-conventional level of
morality, and therefore egocentric. According to his
model, individual and social attributes such as compassion, democracy, and sexual equality only become
possible at fulcrum-5, when formal operational cognition develops. As a consequence, in order to fit his
ontogenetic model to phylogeny, he has to contend
that earlier human beings lacked these “higher” attributes.
Wilber’s stance here is controversial, and has
uncomfortable echoes of the Eurocentric colonial
mentality, which saw primal peoples as inferior or
backward. Habermas’ model of social evolution
(1979) and the Spiral Dynamics model of Beck and
Cowan (1996)—both of which relegate primal peoples
to a low level of development—are vulnerable to this
criticism too. As Kelly (Rothberg and Kelly, 1996)
points out, if we say that human beings during the
typhonic stage were at a pre-personal level of development, we are close to suggesting that they were not
persons at all, even that they were nonhuman. And as
he continues:
If so, the same would have to be said for the many
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aboriginal cultures encountered by modern, mental-egoic,
“rational” cultures capable of formal-operational
thinking. Given Wilber’s adoption of the principle
of ontogenetic recapitulation, this would hold as
well for the very young (or mentally challenged, for
that matter) who fail to manifest fully differentiated
operational thinking (p. 121).
Similar “progressivist” views were put forward by early
neo-colonial thinkers such as Fraser and Comte, both
of whom saw the “magical” religions of primal peoples
as the “lowest” expression of religion. According to
Comte (in Hamilton, 1995) the primitive “fetichistic”
stage is transcended—in sequence—by the polytheistic,
monotheistic, metaphysical and positive stages. To
Fraser (1959), the magical stage was transcended by
the religious and the scientific. Freud’s model of phylogenetic development—which he also believed ran
parallel with ontogeny—puts “the primitive” at the
“narcissism” stage of young children (Freud, 1946).
I am certainly not suggesting that Wilber has a
neo-Colonial outlook himself, or accusing him—or
Habermas or Beck and Cowan—of fascism. Wilber
has written that he eulogises primal tribal societies
because they are “literally our roots, our foundations,
the basis of all that was to follow…the crucial ground
floor upon which so much of history would have to
rest” (1996, p. 175). He has also pointed out that,
whatever their position on the holarchy, all holons
ultimately have “Ground value,” since they are all “a
radiant manifestation of Spirit, of Godhead, of
Emptiness” (2000b, p. 324). Nevertheless, there is a
denigration of primal peoples here which is—I intend
to show—unjustified. I believe there is a great deal of
evidence suggesting that primal peoples did possess
many of the higher characteristics that Wilber believes
can only arise at the egoic and post-egoic levels. Or
more generally, I believe that in some respects primal
tribal cultures reached a higher level of development
than modern postindustrial societies. However, above
and beyond this, I believe that the primary problem is
not a parsimonious view of primal peoples, but the
application of ontogeny to phylogeny which leads to
this parsimonious view. In my opinion, this application is a fallacy, similar to Wilber’s pre/trans fallacy, in
the sense that a number of superficial similarities
prompt one to take the giant leap to complete identification. Primal peoples seem to possess a simple,
undivided consciousness and a strong sense of connection to the natural world; they also seem to have less
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developed powers of rationality and intellect, and a less
developed sense of individuality and separateness. But
to leap from these similarities to the conclusion that
their level of consciousness is exactly that of ontogenetic fulcrum-2 or 3, and that they share exactly the
same state of pre-egoic fusion which children experience, is unwarranted. Wilber himself recognises that
the application of ontogeny to phylogeny is sometimes
unfounded, noting that there are “many places that
strict onto/phylo parallels break down” (Wilber, 2000a,
p. 146), but in my view the matter is much more problematic than he believes.
Before I begin with this, however, I ought to define
exactly what (or who) I mean by “primal peoples.” In
the sense I am using the term, it refers both to huntergatherer tribal and early horticultural peoples who
lived during earlier epochs but whose cultures have
now disappeared (e.g., the pre-Indo-European inhabitants of Europe and the pre-Semitic inhabitants of the
Middle East), and also to tribal peoples whose cultures
survived until recent centuries (e.g. Native Americans,
Australian Aborigines, traditional Africans). Some
writers have warned against inferring from contemporary to prehistoric tribal groups (e.g. Roszak, 1992),
and I believe this is justified in the sense that every
tribal culture in existence now has been disrupted—
and in many cases destroyed—by external influences.
There is probably no genuinely primal culture left in
the world. The culture of the Native Americans and
the Australian Aborigines was disrupted centuries ago,
while lesser known peoples such as the Trobriand
Islanders, the Muria of India, the Nuer of Africa, the
Mbuti (or pygmies) of central Africa, the Andaman
islanders and others have suffered the same fate relatively recently.1 But I believe it is valid to see these peoples at the times when Europeans first had contact with
them (and for a period afterwards), as a kind of window
through which we can look back at the history of the
whole human race. These were cultures that had been
unchanged for thousands of years. As the anthropologist Robert Lawlor (1991) writes, for instance,
Traditional archaeological evidence holds that
Aboriginal culture has existed in Australia for
60,000 years, but more recent evidence indicates
that the period is more like 120,000 or 150,000
years. The Aborigines’ rituals, beliefs and cosmology
may represent the deepest collective memory of our
race (p. 9).
In any case, what anthropologists tell us of these peo-

ples corresponds very closely to Wilber’s (and
Habermas’) depiction of early human beings at the
typhonic stage (e.g., their tribal system, hunter-gatherer
lifestyle, animistic and magical worldviews). And in
fact most scholars accept that archaeological and
ethnographic evidence are closely related. As Lenski
(1978) wrote, “Comparisons are not only valid but
extremely valuable.…The similarities are many and
basic; the differences are fewer and much less important” (p. 137).
However, I must first say that in some respects I
agree with Wilber and Habermas. I believe it’s justifiable to say that primal peoples were at a “pre-rational”
level, or at least did not possess rational-logical powers
to the same extent that we do. This is a controversial
issue in itself, and many “retro-romantics” will take me
to task for this, but I believe that the prevalence of
magical beliefs and practices, irrational taboos and
superstitions amongst primal peoples is clear evidence
of this. These show an inability to come to grips with
causal mechanisms and logical systems, and a less
developed ability to analyse and systematise.
The relative lack of technological and scientific
development of primal peoples may also seem to offer
some evidence for this. This is problematic, however.
It’s true that, apart from a few exceptions, early human
beings and primal peoples like the Aborigines and
Native Americans had only rudimentary engineering
and building skills, rudimentary medical science, and
no written language. However, to see Aborigines and
Native Americans as “backward” because of their lack
of technology ignores the fact that most primal peoples were so well adapted to their environments that
they did not actually need technology. The lives of
hunter-gatherer tribes were actually much easier than
those of the horticulturalists and agriculturalists who
came after them—even easier, in some respects, than
our lives. Far from exhausting themselves in their
search for food, hunter-gatherers actually spent only
12 to 20 hours per week searching for it (Rudgley,
1993; Sahlins, 1972).2 The diet of hunter-gatherers
was also extremely healthy. Apart from the small
amount of meat they ate (10%–20% of their diet)
their diet was practically identical to that of a modern-day
vegan, with no dairy products and a wide variety of
fruits, vegetables, roots, and nuts, all eaten raw (which
nutrition experts tell us is the healthiest way to eat.)
This partly explains why most of the skeletons of
ancient hunter-gatherers that have been discovered
Primal Spirituality and the Onto/Phylo Fallacy
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have been surprisingly large and robust, and show few
signs of degenerative diseases and tooth decay
(Rudgley, 1998).3
In terms of evolutionary theory, then, we can probably say that primal peoples’ low level of technology is
largely the result of a lack of survival pressure. After all,
why would they need to invent the wheel, the plough,
or even electricity or computers, when they could live
perfectly well without them?
However, despite this there is a good case for
accepting Wilber’s view that earlier human beings were
at a “pre-rational” level of development. (Both he and
Habermas believe that hunter-gatherer societies were
“preformal,” but since the issue of whether Piaget’s formal operational cognition exists as a genuine stage is so
controversial, I would stop short of this.) In almost
every other area, however, Wilber’s analysis of early
human beings and primal peoples is, I believe, inaccurate—necessarily so, since he is forced to make fallacious judgements in order to hitch his ontogenetic
spectrum of consciousness to phylogeny.

Primal Religion

A

ccording to Wilber, at the psychic level (fulcrum-7)
we experience nature as divine. We sense the presence of brahman in everything—or, as it has elsewhere
been called, dharmakaya (Mahayana Buddhism), God
(Christian Mysticism), consciousness-force (Sri
Aurobindo), or the One (Plotinus). As we’ve noted,
Wilber contends that primal peoples cannot have
access to the psychic levels, except as exceptional individuals. A thorough examination of primal cultures,
however, strongly suggests that primal peoples in general (not just through a few exceptional individuals)
were aware of the presence of “consciousness-force”
everywhere around them. They do not simply see
nature as Spirit but as an expression of it. Spirit is in
nature, rather than exclusively identified with it.
The concept of “God” can have two meanings in
relation to primal peoples. Although most huntergatherer and simple horticultural societies do not conceive of a supreme creator, some do conceive of a
“God” who created the world, a personal being who
then stepped aside and is no longer involved with his
creation. According to Eliade :
Like many celestial Supreme Beings of “primitive”
peoples, the High Gods of a great number of
African ethnic groups are regarded as creators, all
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powerful and benevolent and so forth; but they play
a rather insignificant part in the religious life. Being
either too distant or too good to need a real cult,
they are involved only in cases of great crisis (1967, p. 6).
However, “God” can also refer to an animating force
which pervades all things. The Iroquois called this
Orenda, to the Hopi it was Maasauu, the Nuer of
Africa call it Kwoth, the Ufaina of the Amazon call it
Fufaka, Melanesian peoples refer to it as Mana, and so
on. Every primal culture without exception has a term
for this force. The word the Plains Indians used for
“Great Spirit,” Wakataka, literally means “the force
which moves all things.” Here a member of the
Pawnee tribe describes their “supreme God”:
We do not think of Tirawa as a person. We think of
Tirawa as [a power which is] in everything
and…moves upon the darkness, the night, and
causes her to bring forth the dawn. It is the breath
of the new-born dawn (Eliade, 1967, p. 13).
In my view this force is clearly one and the same as
brahman or consciousness-force. The important point,
again, is that Spirit is in nature, rather than actually
being nature. The passage above invites comparison
with any of the passages from the Upanishads which
describe the presence of brahman within the manifest
world. For example,
Shining, yet hidden, Spirit lives in the cavern.
Everything that sways, breathes, opens, closes, lives
in Spirit....
Spirit is everywhere, upon the right, upon the left,
above, below, behind, in front.
What is the world but Spirit?
(in Happold, 1963, p. 146).
The attempts anthropologists have made to translate
primal peoples’ terms for “consciousness-force” make
this connection clearer. The German anthropologist F.
Speiser (speaking of the natives of the New Hebrides)
used the term Lebenskraft (lifepower); Dr. PechuelLoesche (speaking of the Loango of Africa) called it
Potenz; while another German anthropologist, R.
Neuhaus (speaking of the natives of New Guinea) used
the term Seelenstoff (soulstuff ) (Levy-Bruhl, 1965).
Perhaps clearest of all though is this description by the
British anthropologist J.H. Holmes of what the natives
of the Purari Delta in New Guinea called imunu.
Holmes translates this as “soul” or “living principle,”
and writes:
[Imunu] was associated with everything, nothing
arrived apart from it...nothing animate or inanimate
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could exist apart from it. It was the soul of
things....It was intangible, but like air, wind, it
could manifest its presence. It permeated everything
that made up life to the people of the Purari
Delta....[It was] that which enables everything to
exist as we know it, and distinct from other things
which, too, exist by it (in Levy-Bruhl, 1965, p. 17).
In other words, consciousness-force doesn’t just pervade all reality, it is the source of all reality—which is
exactly what the Upanishads (and the world’s other
mystical traditions) tell us of brahman.
Wilber might contend that I am falling victim to
the pre/trans fallacy here, and say that primal peoples’
apparent sense of the divine is the result of their prepersonal fusion with the world. But primal peoples do
not, strictly speaking, experience a state of fusion with
this force. Although (as we will see in a moment) they
recognise that Spirit is the essence of their own being
as well, they experience a sense of differentiation
between themselves and consciousness-force. They
speak of it as something external, something which is
“out there” in the world, which they perceive with a
degree of subject-object duality. In other words, this is
not the same state of pre-egoic fusion with the world
which young children experience, but the differentiated
experience of the divine of fulcrum-7. Wilber accepts
that an individual at the magical stage may have a peak
—or peek—experience of the transpersonal realms, but
here we appear to be dealing with enduring structures—
a permanent, consolidated awareness of the divine.
The third main aspect of primal religion, after the
creator God and the consciousness-force, is the presence of spirits. There are, generally, two kinds of spirits: those which are the spirits of dead human beings,
and those which have always existed as spirits. These
are everywhere; every object and every phenomenon is
either inhabited by or connected to a particular spirit.
As E.Bolaji Idowu writes of traditional African religion, “there is no area of the earth, no object or creature, which has not a spirit of its own or which cannot
be inhabited by a spirit” (1975, p. 174). These spirits
are not autonomous beings with personalities, like
gods—as Idowu writes, “they are more often than not
thought of as powers which are almost abstract, as
shades or vapours” (pp.173–174). And although to
some extent they are conceived as individual forces,
they are also seen as an expression of the “Great
Spirit.” As Evans-Pritchard (1967) notes of the Nuer,
“God is not a particular air-spirit but the spirit is a fig-

ure of God.…The spirits are not each other but they
are God in different figures” (pp. 51–52). (Note here
that the term “God” does not refer to the creator God
but to God as spirit-force.)
Wilber maintains that this animism is the result of
pre-personal fusion, the lack of a clear distinction
between subject and object. But I believe that animism
is both pre-personal and transpersonal, in the sense
that it is the result of a combination of elements associated with both these levels. At the most basic level,
primal peoples see all things as alive because they are
aware of the Spirit in all things: Spirit makes the world
alive. However, as we have noted, their lower level of
rationality means that the causal mechanisms by which
the natural world operates are not easily comprehensible to them. But they were obliged to find some way
of explaining these, and they did this by translating
their sense of the general aliveness of things into a
belief that phenomena were individually alive with
individual spirits, rather than generally alive with a
common Spirit. These individual spirits had powers of
agency and influence, and could therefore be responsible for events and processes. When a wind suddenly
arose, for example, this could be explained as the
action of a wind-spirit; when somebody became ill this
could be explained as the influence of “evil” spirits.
This was, you might say, a distortion of the original
sense of Spirit, which would certainly not occur in
post-rational spiritual evolution. We should remember, however, that, as Evans-Pritchard (1967) indicates, belief in spirits does not occlude primal peoples’
awareness of Spirit itself, since ultimately individual
spirits are an expression of the Great Spirit.

Other Spiritual Characteristics

A

nother characteristic of higher spiritual states is
the sense that Spirit is not only out there, pervading the world, but also inside us, as the very essence of
our beings. Brahman exists inside us as atman; or as
Meister Eckhart puts it, at our deepest essence there is
an “inner noble man in whom God’s form is stamped,
in whom God’s seed is sown” (1996, p. 95). When
awareness of this divine Self arises, the individual
becomes something of a “divine schizophrenic,” consisting of two selves: the superficial ego-self and the
true, spiritual self, or the “outward” and the “inward”
man, as Eckhart called them.
According to Wilber, this identification with inner
Primal Spirituality and the Onto/Phylo Fallacy
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divinity only becomes possible at fulcrum-7. We have
to first “dis-identify” ourselves with the world, then
with the body and then with the ego. But again,
although this is clear enough from an ontogenetic perspective, primal peoples do not seem to fit into this
framework. This is admittedly not quite so clear from
my research, but there seems to be a general recognition that the individual human spirit is in essence
divine too, as a part of the great ocean of Spirit which
pervades the whole world. In fact, since all natural
things are seen as divine in essence, it would be very
surprising if this was not the case. As the anthropologist H. Sindima writes of traditional African peoples,
for example, “All life—that of people, plants and animals, and the earth—originates and therefore shares
an intimate relationship of bondedness with divine
life; all life is divine life” (1990, p. 144). Similarly, the
Ufaina of the Amazon believe that when a human
being is born a small amount of fufaka (or Spirit)
enters her body. She, and the group to which she
belongs, “borrow” it from the total “stock” of Spirit.
While she lives, therefore, Spirit is always the essence
of her being, and at death it is released and returns to
its source (Hildebrand, 1988).
This incidentally works against Wilber’s claim that
when individuals at lower levels have peak experiences,
the experience will be coloured by and interpreted in
terms of their level of development. When individuals
at the magic stage experience the transpersonal, they
will, he claims, suffer from massive ego-inflation, and
believe that only they are one with God. This is
inevitable since they “cannot take the role of the other
and thus realize that all people—in fact, all sentient
beings—are equally one with God” (Wilber, 2000a,
p.15). But primal peoples’ recognition that “all life is
divine life” strongly suggests that this does not apply to
their experience of the psychic realms.
Some primal peoples show clear awareness of the
“two selves” concept as well. We might take the example of the Australian Aborigines. As we’ve seen, and in
common with the other peoples we have looked at so
far, their animism, magical thinking, and hunter-gatherer
lifestyle locate them squarely at Wilber’s typhonic
stage, corresponding to fulcrum-2 or early fulcrum-3.
At this stage, according to Wilber, their self-sense
should only be associated with their body; there
should be no sense of ego and certainly no sense of
Spirit. But the aborigines appear to possess both of
these simultaneously. Many aboriginal tribes believe
66

that human beings contain two souls, one of which is
the “true soul” and the other of which they call the
“trickster.” As the anthropologist W. Lloyd Warner
wrote of the Murngin tribe:
One is looked upon as fundamental and real, and is
felt to be the true soul....The other is considered a
trickster, of little value, and only in a vague way
associated with the “true man.” The “shadow soul”
causes evil and badness within the personality. The
true soul supplies the eternal element to the cultural life of an individual Murngin. It lifts man from
the simple profane animal level and allows him to
participate fully in the sacred eternal values of the
civilisation (in Eliade, 1966, p.185—86).
Another anthropologist who has intensively studied
aboriginal culture, Robert Lawlor (1991), describes
the “trickster” as the “source of the individualised ego
[which] can be characterised as the ego soul. This spirit force is bound to locality; to relationships with
wives, husbands and kin relatives; and to material
things such as tools and items of apparel” (p. 345).
This sounds frighteningly similar to the ego as we
understand it—especially when we learn that, as
Lawlor also notes, the trickster resents death because it
takes it away from these material and emotional
attachments. It wants to be immortal, in eternity with
its pleasures and possessions. But in the same way that,
according to the perennial philosophy (and Wilber),
we can only truly find eternity by disidentifying with
the ego-self and orienting ourselves around inner
Spirit, the aborigines recognise that every soul “must
find true immortality in identifying itself with the
enduring energy emanating from the celestial realms of
the Dreamtime ancestors” (Lawlor, 1991, p. 345). In
other words, since the Aboriginal concept of
“Dreaming” corresponds roughly (with distortions
possibly due to magical thinking) to consciousnessforce, we must identify ourselves purely with Spirit.
In the light of this, Fraser’s and Comte’s “progressivist” view of religion does not seem to be justified. If
anything, this primal religion is “higher” than the theistic religions which came afterwards. Theistic religion
can be seen as a fall away from this direct awareness of
the divine. Once theistic religion developed, direct
awareness of the divine became confined to a tiny
number of mystics. And once again, this contradicts
Wilber, who believes that the development of polytheistic and then monotheistic religions—following the
“magical” religion of primal peoples—were progressive
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steps towards the divine (Wilber, 1981).
In fact, in terms of Wilber’s model we are already
dealing with impossibilities. I am suggesting that primal peoples existed at two different levels of consciousness simultaneously. Their lack of rationality and their
magical thinking locates them at fulcrum-2 (or the
early stages of fulcrum-3), but at the same time their
awareness of the divine locates them at fulcrum-7.
Kelly has noted a similar discrepancy, citing the case of
an eight-year-old Hopi girl who seems to inhabit a
“transpersonal world space” whilst only having reached
—according to Wilber’s model—the concrete operational stage (Rothberg & Kelly, 1998).4
I believe that Wilber’s model works extremely well
for ontogeny, and it is clear that ontogenetically this is
not possible: as individuals we clearly have to pass
through the pre-personal levels of childhood and the
egoic levels of maturity before we can stabilise ourselves at the transpersonal levels. But this does not
appear to be the case phylogenetically—which suggests that Wilber’s spectrum model cannot be applied
to species development. This might be compatible
with the idea that spirituality is a relatively separate
developmental line (e.g., Wilber 2000a), in which case
we would have to say that with primal peoples the
development of their spiritual line massively outstrips
their cognitive line. But this is very problematic, since
this direct awareness of the divine is surely related to
the psychic stage rather than linear development. The
lines which Wilber classifies as “spiritual” are care,
openness, concern, religious faith, and meditative
stages (2000a), but not this apprehension of spirit.

Egocentrism

F

ollowing Piaget, Wilber suggests that before they
reach the operational stages, children are extremely egocentric. Experiments such as Piaget’s famous
“Swiss mountain scene” (Piaget & Inhelder,1956),
purported to demonstrate that children are unable to
see the world from other people’s perspective. As a
result, they are—according to Piaget and Wilber—
incapable of empathy and compassion, since these
depend on looking at the world from the perspective
of others, and “feeling with” them.
If primal peoples have only reached Wilber’s fulcrum-2, corresponding to Piaget’s preoperational
stage, we would expect them to be similarly egocentric.
But the reality could hardly be more different. In fact,

primal peoples are characterised by a pronounced lack
of egocentrism. They generally display a strong sense
of empathy and compassion for other living beings,
and for nature in general. The fact that hunter-gatherers
obtain 10 to 20 percent of their food through hunting
might seem to contradict this, but most primal peoples
approach hunting with great respect and compassion
for their prey. Hunting is usually seen as an unfortunate necessity, and the act of killing is never performed
with pleasure. Turnbull (1993) describes how, to the
Mbuti of Africa, hunting is the “original sin,” which
occurred when a mythical ancestor killed an antelope
and then ate it to conceal his act. Since then, all animals—including human beings—have been condemned to die. Partly because of this philosophy, they
are “gentle hunters” who never show “any expression
of joy, nor even of pleasure” (p. 7), when they make a
catch. They never kill more than they need for one
day, since “to kill more than is absolutely necessary
would be to heighten the consequences of that original
sin and confirm even more firmly their own mortality”
(Turnbull, 1993, p. 7). Similarly, Rudgley (1998)
compares traditional hunters to modern fox or game
hunters and concludes the former are characterised by
“a great degree of respect for their quarry and even a
pang of regret at having to kill animals at all.” There
are, he states, “numerous cases of empathy and even
reverence for animals among the hunting peoples of
northern Canada and elsewhere” (p.113).
This strong sense of empathy means that primal
peoples are reluctant to damage or destroy any natural
phenomena. Edward T. Hall (1984) cites the case of an
agricultural agent who was sent to work with the
Pueblo Indians of New Mexico. Through the summer
and winter he got along well with them, but when
Spring came around their attitude to him suddenly
became hostile. The Indians refused to say what the
problem was, just that “he just doesn’t know certain
things” (p. 92). Eventually, however, it emerged that
the agent had tried to make them start “early spring
plowing,” which offended their empathic sense that in
spring the earth is pregnant with new life and must be
treated gently. In spring, Hall noted, the Indians
remove steel shoes from their horses, and refuse to
wear European shoes or to use wagons, for fear that
they might damage the earth.
Even now there is continual conflict between
American Indians and European-American companies
who want to “develop” lands which the Indians believe
Primal Spirituality and the Onto/Phylo Fallacy
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are sacred. Often the Indians refuse to let mining take
place on their reservations, even though this would
bring them massive financial benefits. In the Northern
Cheyenne Reservation in Montana, for example, it is
estimated that there are around 50 billion tons of coal,
but despite large scale poverty and unemployment on
the reservation, the Indians’ empathic sense of the
aliveness of nature means that they will not allow mining to take place (Bryan, 1996).
(This is incidentally a reason that I dispute Wilber’s
view that primal peoples were potentially—apart from
their lack of technology—as environmentally destructive as we are. Their awareness of Spirit pervading the
whole of nature, their sense of the alive-ness of natural
phenomena, and their sense of connection to nature,
meant that they had—and have—an extreme reluctance to damage or even interfere with nature.
Correspondingly, our lack of connection to and empathy with nature is, I believe, one of the root causes of
the ecological crisis. Wilber maintains (in 1995, for
example) that ecological awareness can only arise with
formal operational cognition, when we become capable of grasping mutual interrelationships. But surely
there is another kind of ecological awareness which is
nonrational, and which stems from the sense of
empathic connection with the natural world—in other
words, from direct perceptual awareness and a shared
sense of being, rather than from rationality).5
The quality of compassion is so central to
Aboriginal culture that mothers take care to “teach” it
to their children. Often, when a child grabs some food
or another object and holds it to its mouth, the mother—or another female relative—pretends to be in need
of it, to encourage a spirit of sharing. Similarly, whenever a weak or ill person or animal comes by, the
mother makes a point of expressing sympathy for it,
and offering it food (Lawlor, 1991). As Lawlor notes,
by these means “the child experiences a world in which
compassion and pity are dramatically directed towards
the temporarily less fortunate. The constant maternal
dramatization of compassion in the early years orients
a child’s emotions toward empathy, support, warmth
and generosity” (p. 247).
Egocentrism gives rise to a whole host of negative
human traits. The individual is dominated by his or
her own needs and desires, and refuses to let the needs
of other individuals or of the community as a whole
come before them. After all, since he cannot “put himself in other people’s shoes,” he cannot understand, or
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even be aware of, the needs and desires of others. This
leads to behaviour that we associate with greed and
selfishness. And according to Piaget and Wilber, for
children below the age of 7—at the pre-operational
level—this selfishness is inevitable. Children are
extremely reluctant to share, and so might eat a whole
bag of sweets themselves instead of offering them to
their siblings, or throw away toys they are bored with,
without thinking that another child might like them.
But we do not find any behaviour resembling this
amongst primal peoples. In fact, again, we find the
complete opposite: a powerful spirit of reciprocity and
sharing, and ethical systems which negate any expression of greed. One of the fundamental cultural differences that made Native Americans unable to adapt to
the European way of life was that, whereas Europeans
became successful and respected as a result of accumulating wealth for themselves, the Indians gained kudos
by distributing wealth. Even the Incas, who shared
many negative European traits—such as militarism,
patriarchy, and social stratification—possessed a welfare system, the like of which the U.S. and Europe
have only seen during the last few decades. Every town
had a large number of warehouses, full of provisions
and supplies which—except in times in war—would
be distributed amongst the poor, the disabled, widows,
and the old (Wright, 1992). The same is true of traditional African culture, where to hoard any wealth for
oneself, and so to deprive the other members of the
community, is regarded as a heinous sin. To traditional Africans, hospitality is a moral imperative; greed
breaks the communitarian principles which sustain the
universe. As Magesa writes:
What constitutes misuse of the universe? This question can be answered in one word: greed....Greed
constitutes the most grievous wrong. Indeed, if
there is one word that describes the demands of the
ethics of African Religion, sociability (in the sense of
hospitality, open-hearted sharing) is that word
(1997, p. 62).
This lack of egocentrism and selfishness is probably
the main reason that both hunter-gatherer and early
horticultural societies are generally completely egalitarian, with no private property or social stratification.
Many primal peoples seem to exist in a natural state of
communism—a fact which Marx himself recognised,
and referred to as “primitive communism.” According
to Lenski’s statistics in Human Societies (1978)—based
on the data in Murdock’s Ethnographic Atlas—only
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2% of contemporary hunter-gatherer societies have a
class system, while private ownership of land is completely absent in 89% of them (and only “rare” in the
other 11%). Similarly, Lenski notes that slavery is
“extremely rare” amongst hunter-gatherers (in contrast
to “advanced horticultural” societies, 83% of which
possess it) and that they tend to have a strikingly democratic system of making decisions. Many societies
have nominal chiefs, but their power is usually very
limited, and they can easily be deposed if the rest of
the group are not satisfied with their leadership.
Political decisions are not taken by the chief alone, but
are usually “arrived at through informal discussions
among the more respected and influential members,
typically the heads of families” (Lenksi, 1978, p. 125).
As Briggs (1970) wrote of the Utku Eskimos of northern Canada, for instance,
The Utku, like other Eskimo bands, have no formal
leaders whose authority transcends that of the separate householders. Moreover, cherishing independence of thought and action as a natural prerogative,
people tend to look askance at anyone who seems to
aspire to tell them what to do. (p. 42)
While as Christopher Boehm (1999) summarises,
“This egalitarian approach seems to be universal for
foragers who live in small bands that remain nomadic,
suggesting considerable antiquity for political egalitarianism” (p. 69).
Some anthropologists have attempted to explain
this egalitarianism in terms of socioeconomic factors.
For example, Cashdan (1980) suggests that huntergatherers are inevitably egalitarian because of their
mobile lifestyle, which means that there can only be a
very limited amount of private property. Alternatively,
Gluckman (1965) suggests that egalitarianism comes
from the absence of role-specialisation, which means
that no one can have a more important role than anyone else, so that status differences cannot occur.
However, it’s difficult to see how equality merely in
terms of possessions or social roles should necessarily
lead to a lack of leadership, or group decision-making
processes. And in any case, egalitarianism is by no
means confined to hunter-gatherer societies. There are
many horticultural peoples who do not live a mobile
lifestyle and do have different social roles, and yet are
also completely egalitarian. As Boehm summarises
again,
Many other nonliterates [besides hunter-gatherers],
people who live in permanent, settled groups that

accumulate food surpluses through agriculture, are
quite similar politically [to hunter-gatherers]....
These tribesmen lack strong leadership and domination among males, they make their group decisions by consensus and they too exhibit an egalitarian ideology. (p.38)
Democracy and egalitarianism appear somehow natural
to primal peoples, whether they are hunter-gatherers
or simple horitculturalists.
This was another source of problems between
Europeans and American Indians. The latter could not
comprehend the concept of private ownership of land,
or the massive inequalities that ran through European
society. As Sitting Bull complained, “The White Man
knows how to make everything, but he does not know
how to distribute it....The love of possession is a disease with them. They take tithes from the poor and
weak to support the rich who rule” (Wright, 1992, p.
344). While the Europeans, for their part, saw the
“communism” of the natives as a defect which had prevented them from becoming “civilised.” As Senator
Henry Dawes—whose “Dawes Act” attempted to
make Amerindians into small-scale landowners—said
of the Cherokee Nation in 1887,
There is not a pauper in that nation, and the nation
does not owe a dollar....Yet the defect of the system
was apparent. They have got as far as they can go,
because they hold their land in common....There is
no selfishness, which is at the bottom of civilisation.
(Wright, 1992, p. 363)
Primal peoples are clearly not, then, egocentric to anything like the degree that children at fulcrums 2 or 3
are. They clearly can take the role of the other—or perhaps more strictly, their less strong sense of ego means
that they experience a shared sense of being with other
holons. Perhaps we are dealing with two different
kinds of empathy here, corresponding to the two different kinds of ecological awareness I mentioned earlier.
There is a typically “Eurocentric” empathy, which is
the result of heightened rationality, and comes from
taking the perspective of the other. And there is a typically—more powerful—“primal” kind of empathy,
which does not come from role-taking, but from actually sharing identity with the other, and actually experiencing its state of being and its suffering or joy.
Again, this suggests that Wilber’s ontogenetic
model cannot be applied to phylogeny. In fact, like
their awareness of Spirit, primal peoples’ pronounced
ability to empathise puts them way above the developPrimal Spirituality and the Onto/Phylo Fallacy
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mental level which he allocates to them. According to
his model, there is a widening circle of identity—and
of empathy—which develops as we move through to
higher fulcrums. At fulcrum-4 we cease to be completely egocentric, and become sociocentric, identifying with our tribal or social group (in Kohlberg’s
terms, we move from pre-conventional to conventional morality). At fulcrum-5, our circle of identity and
empathy expands to the whole human race; we
become worldcentric. At fulcrum-7, the circle widens
to include all living beings; and at fulcrum-8, it
expands to all reality, all manifestations of Spirit
(Wilber, 1995). Based on the above evidence, it seems
entirely justifiable to place primal peoples at fulcrum-7,
perhaps even higher.
Once again, this makes absolutely no sense in
terms of Wilber’s model. In terms of Kohlberg’s hierarchy of moral development, primal peoples should—
according to Wilber—only have a pre-conventional
morality, with their sole moral motivation the completely egocentric goal of avoiding punishment and
gaining rewards. But they clearly have a much higher
level of morality than this. As Magesa indicates above,
the main motivation of their morality is not personal
or even communal, but universal: to preserve the harmony of the universe. This clearly suggests that, at
least in some respects, they possess a post-conventional
morality.
Another conundrum to which the above analysis
gives rise is the apparent fact that we Europeans are
more egocentric than primal peoples. This is evident
from a number of factors: our much more pronounced
desire for status and power and material goods (i.e.,
greed), the extreme competitiveness of our culture, the
emphasis on the individual over the community, social
stratification, and—perhaps most emphatically—our
lack of empathy with the natural world, our inability
to “feel with” nature. According to Wilber’s analysis—
and those of Habermas and Beck and Cowan—as evolution progresses there should be a decline in egocentrism. And again, in ontogenetic development this is
indisputably the case. But equally indisputably, in
terms of the development of our species this is not the
case. Lenski (1978) has also noted that, rather than
showing a forward movement away from savagery and
toward greater democracy and humanity, our cultural
evolution actually shows a regression in this regard. As
he states, “as numerous scholars have noted, it is one
of the great ironies of evolution that progress in tech70

nology and social structure is often linked with ethical
regress” (p. 176). He noted that the evolution from
hunter-gatherer societies to horticultural and then
agrarian societies is marked by “the decline in the practice of sharing and the growing acceptance of economic
and other kinds of inequality” (Lenski, 1978, p. 176).6
I am not trying to turn the tables completely
though, by suggesting that our egocentrism is the same
as young children’s. We might say that there are two
different kinds of egocentrism: a pre-egoic level and
post-egoic one. The first stems from not having an ego
as an organising centre with which to control your
desires and impulses and take the perspectives of others; as a result you are dominated by your selfish
desires, and can’t see beyond them. The second stems
from having a sense of ego which is too developed,
which is too separate—so separate that it is “walled
off ” from other human beings and occludes the capacity for empathy. Its separateness also creates a new
surge of selfish desires as a compensation for isolation.
The ability to take perspectives is possible here, but
often it is sacrificed to these powerful egocentric
desires. But native peoples, it seems, lie somewhere
between these two. They do have a sense of ego, of
course (this is another area where I disagree with
Wilber), but their egos are less developed than ours. To
them the ego is developed enough to act as an organising centre, enabling them to transcend selfish
impulses, but is not strong enough to “wall them off ”
from each other and the world.

Enlightened Social Characteristics

T

his obviously contrasts with the “progressivist”
view of human history put forward by Wilber,
Habermas, and Beck and Cowan—and in particular,
with Wilber’s view of phylogeny as a gradual advancement of the human species, progressing from one fulcrum
to the next, and leading to higher levels of cultural and
social development.
And there is another persuasive argument against
his progressivist view of phylogeny, which is the apparent prevalence of “higher” social and cultural characteristics amongst primal peoples.
According to Wilber, enlightened social characteristics such as nonmilitarism, democracy, and equality
can only occur when societies as a whole move to the
formal-operational level. This is happening at the present time, and has been since the beginning of the
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“high ego” or egoic-rational phase at around 500 BCE.
This phase reached its fruition in the sixteenth century,
with the rise of the modern state, and gradually began
to manifest itself in the “Enlightenment” principles of
equality and democracy. It led to the end of slavery, the
end of autocratic monarchies, women’s rights, workers’
rights, a decline in militarism, and the like (Wilber,
1995).
Again, since primal peoples are allegedly at a preoperational stage of cognition, and have only reached
fulcrum-2 (or early 3), we would expect to find a complete absence of these characteristics, or at the very
least to find that they were as warlike, as socially stratified, and as patriarchal as more recent societies have
been. Wilber maintains that this is the case—or at least
that, if it is not, this is only because of accidental economic factors. He agrees that patriarchy was absent
from hunter-gatherer and simple horticultural societies, for example, but argues that this was a simple
consequence of the fact that women had a much more
prominent role economically—in fact during both
phases they produced around 80% of the food.
Patriarchy began, he argues, with the transition from
horticultural to agrarian society—in other words,
when the plough began to be used, which meant that
women began to be excluded from economic life
(since working with heavy ploughs would have made
them miscarry) (Wilber, 1995). At the same time, he
flatly denies that war and inequality were less prevalent
amongst these societies.
However, we have already seen that social stratification and inequality were generally absent from primal
cultures. Most hunter-gatherer groups, and many
sedentary horticultural tribes, were strikingly democratic to a degree which the modern world has only
recently begun to reach, and is still some way from
equalling. In fact there is a very good case for suggesting that, at least to some extent, the modern concepts
of democracy and equality were derived from primal
peoples: specifically, from the Native Americans. The
authors of the American constitution borrowed their
concept of a union of different states from the centuries-old “Six Nations” confederacy of the Iroquois
Indians—in fact the idea was actually recommended
to the Europeans by a leader of the Six Nations at a
treaty signing in 1744, at which Benjamin Franklin
was present (Wright, 1992). Similarly, the constitution’s concept of a non-hierarchical society - which
was, after all, completely alien to Europe at that

time—was to a large extent inspired by the authors’
observations of Native American societies. In the
words of Alvin M. Josephy Jr (1975),
Colonial records show that many of the Indian peoples of the Atlantic seaboard taught the European
settlers much with regard to freedom, the dignity of
the individual, democracy, representative government, and the right to participate in the settling of
one’s affairs. (p. 39)
It’s ironic that, as well as being the originators of modern capitalist democracy, the Iroquois were also partly
responsible for modern communism. In 1851 Lewis
Henry Morgan published his book League of the
Iroquois, reporting his anthropological observations of
Iroquois society. Both Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels
read the book, and were inspired by what they saw as
an example of a Utopian socialist society. As Engels
wrote to Marx, “This gentle constitution is wonderful!
There can be no poor and needy....All are free and
equal—including the women” (Wright, 1992, p. 276).
The great majority of primal cultures are also strikingly unwarlike.7 Lenski (1978) notes, for example,
that for hunter-gatherers “the incidence of violence is
strikingly low....[W]arfare is uncommon and violence
between members of the same group is infrequent” (p.
422). This was also true during the early to middle
Neolithic period of history, when simple horticultural
societies developed. As Lenksi notes, “there is little evidence of warfare during the early Neolithic. Graves
rarely contain weapons and most communities had no
walls or other defenses....Later in the Neolithic the picture changed drastically and warfare became increasingly common” (pp. 148–149). The idea that “war is
old as humanity” is now disputed by the majority of
archaeologists and anthropologists. In The Origin of
War (1995), for example, J.M.G. van der Dennen surveys over 500 primal peoples, the vast majority of
whom he finds to be “highly unwar-like,” with a small
proportion who have mild, low-level, or ritualized warfare. Similarly, R. Brian Ferguson (2000) has stated that
“the global pattern of actual evidence indicates that
war as a regular pattern is a relatively recent development in human history, emerging as our ancestors left
the simple, mobile hunter-gatherer phase” (p. 160).
In other words, when we look back at history we
do not see a gradual ascent to present day Western
democracy, equality, and (relative) nonmilitarism. First
of all, we see an earlier time when these qualities were
already present. The ancient hunter-gatherers and simPrimal Spirituality and the Onto/Phylo Fallacy
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ple horticulturalists clearly possessed “enlightened”
social characteristics which should only, according to
Wilber, manifest themselves at the formal-operational
level. Beck and Cowan’s view that from 50,000 to
10,000 years ago—when the “red meme” was dominant—human beings were extremely self-assertive,
battling with one another for status and demanding
attention and respect, does not hold true. These
authors appear to fall for the pernicious—and totally
unjustified—myth of prehistoric cave-dwelling “savages” whose lives were a harsh and bleak struggle for
survival, and who constantly fought over food and
women and used any excuse to bash each other over
the head with clubs. Again, there are hints of a kind of
neocolonialism at work, with a very Victorian—and
very false—view of human history as a slow progression from primitive chaos and ignorance to increased
enlightenment and order.
After this early more “idyllic” phase, we see an
apparent “Fall” into war, patriarchy, and social stratification (as well as greater egocentrism). And later
still—during recent centuries—we see a gradual reemergence of these “higher” social characteristics.

Summary

T

o summarise, then, Wilber’s view of prehistoric
human beings—and the application of ontogeny
to phylogeny that prompts this view—is problematic
for the following reasons. Firstly, primal peoples exhibit higher spiritual characteristics, including a) an
awareness of Spirit pervading the manifest world, b) an
awareness of the inner Spirit or atman, and c) an
awareness of the “two selves,” the ego and the divine
self. This would paradoxically locate them at fulcrum7, while their lack of hypthetico-deductive reasoning
and their magical thinking locates them—according to
Wilber’s model—at fulcrum-2 or 3.
Secondly, primal peoples show no sign of the egocentrism which, according to Wilber and Piaget, children
at preoperational levels exhibit. Their “universal” empathy
suggests fulcrum-7 or higher, and a post-conventional
morality. They experience an intense intersubjectivity,
a shared sense of being with other creatures and with
the phenomenal world in general, which generates
compassion and an ecological sensibility.
Thirdly, primal cultures exhibit enlightened social
characteristics, such as democracy and peacefulness,
which, according to Wilber, should only emerge at ful-
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crum-5, or during the high egoic period.
There is, however, another point I would like to
add briefly, which in my view further undermines the
application of ontogeny to phylogeny. Following
Gebser, Cassirer and Neumann, Wilber suggests that,
like young children, the earliest human beings had no
sense of separation from their environment, and no
sense of subject-object duality. As Wilber (1996)
writes, at fulcrum-2 “mind and world are not clearly
differentiated, so their characteristics tend to get fused
and confused” (1996, p.173). Or as he elsewhere puts
it typhonic man would “tend to confuse psychic with
external reality, almost as a man does when he dreams”
(1981, p. 46). As we saw earlier, this is the basis of
Wilber’s interpretation of animism: because of their
pre-personal fusion, children and primal people see the
whole world as an extension of themselves. But if primal peoples really did confuse internal and external
reality, their survival chances would have been drastically impaired. How could you be sure whether things
were really there or just images in your mind? If you
were out hunting and saw a bear, you might find yourself running after an apparition and throwing your
spear into empty space. Or you might see a wolf or a
lion and decide that it was probably only an image in
your mind, only for your flesh to be ripped to pieces a
few seconds later. And even if you knew that there was
something real there, in your dream-like state it would
be difficult to find the alertness to react to it quickly.
The business of keeping yourself alive requires a sense
of differentiation between yourself and your environment. Babies live in a state of “pre-personal” fusion
with the world, and obviously wouldn’t survive without the help of adults—not just because of their physical inability, but also because of their lack of a sense of
subject-object duality.
The truth is probably that, as I have already hinted
(e.g., in my discussion of the aboriginal notion of the
“two-selves”), early human beings did have a degree of
separate-self development, but a smaller degree than
ours. The difference between them and later peoples is
that the latter developed a sharper and more defined
sense of ego. The egos of primal peoples are not so
developed that they result in a sense of disassociation
from the physical body or from nature, or that individual desires take precedence over communal or universal welfare (or that they possess hypthetico-deductive
reasoning powers). However, later human beings—
including us moderns—possess what Barfield
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describes as “the individual, sharpened, spatially determined consciousness of today” (Wilber, 1981, p. 28)
and so do experience a painful sense of separation from
the world, from other human beings, and even from
our own bodies (and are capable of hypthetico-deductive
reasoning). In other words—again in opposition to the
application of ontogeny to phylogeny—primal peoples are not at a pre-personal level, but at a less developed personal level. And as I suggested earlier, their
less developed sense of ego means that whereas we
experience a “post-egoic” egocentrism, they exhibit a
lack of egocentrism and selfishness.
What we really need, in order to fully substantiate
the argument of this essay, are two things. First, we
need a different view of spirituality, which could
account for the fact that primal peoples are “spiritual”
and pre-rational at the same time. (Kelly [1998] has
suggested one possibility here, namely that the “psychic” should not be seen as a stage but as “the ground,
depth dimension, or ‘implicate order’ of typhonic consciousness” [p. 122].) Second, we need a different view
of phylogeny, to replace the ontogeny-based models. I
do not have space here to investigate these areas properly, and hope to deal with them in future papers. But
I would like to suggest briefly that the basis of a different view of phylogeny should be what the myths of
many different cultures describe as a “Fall.” As many
of the myths indicate, the “Fall” was precisely the
development I referred to earlier: the development of a
much stronger and sharper sense of ego in certain
human groups. A bare skeleton of a three-stage model
of phylogeny might be as follows:
1. The “pre-Fall” period (from the beginnings of
the human race to 4000 BCE, and later in many
places). This covers both the hunter-gatherer and the
simple horticultural phases of human history (or the
Paleolithic to the mid Neolithic). During these phases
human groups were peaceful, democratic, free from
social stratification and private property, highly
attuned to the natural world, and nonpatriarchal. The
negative aspects of this phase were the lack of understanding of causal relationships—especially in terms of
natural phenomena—and the irrationality of superstitions and taboos.
2. The “fallen” period (from around 4000 BCE
onward). The “Fall” appears to have begun with certain human groups inhabiting the Middle East and
central Asia at this time, whose psyche was apparently
transformed by an environmental catastrophe; namely,

a massive process of dessication of previously fertile
lands (see DeMeo, 1998, for a discussion of this).
Forced to leave their homelands, these peoples—
including the Indo-Europeans and the Semites—
migrated throughout the Middle East, Europe, and
Asia and in this way their “fallen” culture eventually
spread to large areas of the globe. The characteristics of
this stage include patriarchy, intense warfare, social
stratification, a hostile attitude to the human body and
nature, theism (both polytheism and monotheism),
capitalism, private property, and the like. The Fall also
resulted in the increased egocentrism which I mentioned above, and a sharp decline in ecological awareness. Positive aspects of this phase include increased
rationality, enabling a transcendence of magical thinking.
This phase corresponds to the change that Lenski
(1978) identifies as the shift from simple horticultural
society to advanced horticultural. Lenski himself states
that this phase began at around 4000 BCE, and as
we’ve just noted, his statistics show a sudden increase
in private property, patriarchy, war, and belief in an
active supreme creator—all of which can be explained
in terms of a sudden “ego explosion.” This shift was
marked by technological innovations, such as the use
of new materials like metal and leather and new crafts
such as weaving and pottery (which were very rare
amongst simple horticultural societies). These can
probably also be explained in terms of an “ego explosion,” as a consequence of the intensified powers of
self-reflection and abstract thinking which came with
these peoples’ “sharpened” sense of ego (or in Piaget
and Wilber’s terms, this would be the beginning of formal-operational cognition). And of course, as technological development progressed further, these
advanced horticultural societies gave way to agrarian
and then industrial societies.
3. The “trans-Fall” period (16th century onward?).
This is the phase that we are moving through at present, corresponding to what Wilber calls the “high
egoic” phase. This period features a re-emergence of
pre-Fall characteristics on national and global levels,
including democracy, equality, nonmilitarism, a
healthy acceptance of instincts, a sense of connection
to the natural world, increased sense of empathy with
other beings, etc. Significantly, however, human
beings at this phase retain the positive aspects of the
Fall, and are capable of heightened rationality and
spirituality at the same time.
Primal Spirituality and the Onto/Phylo Fallacy
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Such a model as this dispenses with the need for
phylogeny to recapitulate ontogeny and fits more
closely with the archaeological and anthropological
evidence than Wilber’s, Habermas’ or Beck and
Cowan’s, admitting the possibility that, in some
respects, primal peoples were more advanced than
modern human beings.
For us, spiritual states of being, universal empathy,
post-conventional morality and enlightened social
characteristics do lie at post-rational or post-egoic levels of development. But this is precisely because of our
intensely egoic “individual, sharpened, spatially determined consciousness,” which entailed a loss of the
shared sense of being and intense intersubjectivity of
primal peoples. We have to transcend our separate
sense of ego in order to regain these characteristics. But
primal peoples never developed our intensely egoic
consciousness and never lost their shared sense of
being, and so for them there is nothing to transcend.

End Notes
1. For example, the culture of the Trobriand
Islanders was almost untouched by European influence when the British anthropologist Malinowski
studied them during the 1920s. But now most of the
islanders are Christians, and have become so distanced
from their own traditions that anthropologists from
the University of Papua New Guinea have organised
projects to help them relearn them. The Muria of
India were completely “primal” when the anthropologist W. Elgin lived with them, also during the 1920s.
But now over half of them are Hindus, and they are
also under assault from Christian missionaries who are
determined to spread the gospel to all the world’s
remaining “unreached” peoples. Even more tragically,
only four decades after the publication of Colin
Turnbull’s The Forest People, the rainforest of the
Pygmies is being chopped down by European and
Japanese lumber firms, and the government of Zaire is
pressuring them into giving up the hunter-gatherer
way of life and becoming farmers or city dwellers.
2. This still holds true for the Australian Aborigines
(at least those who still live as hunter-gatherers); they
only spend around 4 hours per day searching for food,
and devote the rest of their time to leisure activities,
such as music, storytelling, artwork, and being with
family and friends (Lawlor, 1991). This fact contradicts Beck and Cowan’s (1996) claim that at the pur-
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ple level, life was/is largely a matter of subsistence and
survival. In fact life only really became “hard” following the advent of agriculture, when people had to work
longer and harder, disease was more widespread, diets
were not as healthy, and lifespans were shorter (Lawlor,
1991; DeMeo, 1998; Rudgley, 1998).
3. The other main reason for this is that the ancient
hunter-gatherers were less vulnerable to disease than
later peoples. In fact, until the advances of modern
medicine and hygiene during the 19th and 20th centuries, they may well have been less afflicted with disease than any other human beings in history. Many of
the diseases to which we are now susceptible arrived
when we domesticated animals, who transmitted a
whole host of diseases that human beings had never
been exposed to before. And later, dairy products
increased our exposure to disease even further
(Rudgley, 1998, 2000).
4. Kelly also suggests that evidence of telepathy
between mother and child conflicts with Wilber’s
model, since he believes telepathy—and other paranormal abilities—can only arise at the psychic levels.
And in connection with this, it is interesting to consider the large amount of evidence suggesting that animals have psychic powers. Sheldrake (2000) puts forward much of this evidence, and suggests that, rather
than their lying in wait for us at a higher level of development, we have lost these powers along the way to
our present state.
5. It’s true that a lack of foresight did sometimes
lead to environmental problems for unfallen peoples.
Prehistoric animals like the Mammoth, the giant
Armadillo of South America, and the pygmy hippopotamus of Cyprus seem to have disappeared as a
result of over-hunting or changes to their environment
caused by humans. And prehistoric humans seem to
have caused some major environmental changes by
burning off massive areas of forest or grassland, or
overgrazing land (Sheldrake, 1990; Roszak, 1992).
Nevertheless, whereas the ideology of our culture promotes environmental destruction, the ideologies and
moral systems of most primal cultures encourage
respect for nature. Many see themselves as stewards or
custodians of the Earth, and perform ceremonies
which they believe will maintain cosmic harmony.
They also try to maintain harmony through their
lifestyles, by not abusing natural phenomena, and
showing respect to animals and plants. As Mbiti writes
of traditional African religion, man “has to live in
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harmony with the universe, obeying the laws of natural, moral and mystical order. If these are unduly disturbed it is man who suffers most” (1975, p. 237).
Their sense of the sacredness of nature may not stop
primal peoples from unintentionally damaging the
environment by over-farming or over-hunting, but it
certainly makes them very reluctant to harm their
environment in a more direct way, by chopping down
trees, ploughing the land, killing animals, and so on.
6. Since Lenski provides us with much of the evidence to support this view, Wilber’s frequent use of
Lenksi’s statistics to support his own views seems puzzling. Lenski’s data in Human Societies does generally
contradict Wilber’s views. He clearly shows that warfare, social inequality, slavery, and private property are
largely absent from both contemporary hunter-gatherer
and simple horticultural societies, and become progressively more prevalent in more technologically
advanced societies (at least until we reach industrial
societies, when they begin to decline). For example,
whereas only 2% and 17% of hunter-gatherer and
simple horticultural societies have class systems, 54%
and 71% of advanced horticultural and then agrarian
societies have them. Whereas war is rare or absent in
73% and 41% of hunter-gatherer and simple horticultural societies, it is perpetual in 34% and common in
48% of advanced horticultural societies (Lenski,
Lenski & Nolan, 1995). In view of this, Wilber’s use
of Lenski’s data has to be selective in order to seem to
justify his views. Perhaps the main problem though is
that Lenski is referring to contemporary examples of
these societies, whereas Wilber treats them as historical
examples. When Lenski says that war is common in
27% of hunter-gatherer societies, and 10% of them
have slavery, this emphatically does not mean that 27%
of ancient hunter-gatherer societies had war, and 10%
had slavery. In fact, given the lack of archaeological
evidence for war from the Paleolithic and early
Neolithic periods of history, and given the cultural disruption of contemporary hunter-gatherers and simple
horticulturalists (and the influence of colonial cultures), we can assume that these figures would be lower
still for ancient societies. Of course, as we have seen,
Lenski believes that we can usefully compare contemporary primal peoples with their historic counterparts,
but he never states that his statistics apply equally to
historic peoples. A more puzzling matter is where
Wilber obtains the statistic—also attributed to
Lenski—that 58% of foraging peoples practise (or

practised, according to Wilber) frequent or intermittent warfare (1995, 1996). I can’t locate this statistic in
either of my two editions of Human Societies. It’s difficult to see how this would be possible when war is
absent or rare in 73% of foraging societies.
7. This doesn’t apply to all primal peoples, of
course. Some primal peoples became much more warlike and socially oppressive through contact with
European peoples—for example, the Plains Indians or
the Jivaro of central America. In Africa, from around
700 C.E., a number of states developed in reaction to
Arabic and European influences—such as Ghana,
Mali, Songhai and later the states of the Zulu and
Ashanti. These were all relatively warlike, socially stratified and patriarchal (Martin & O’Meara, 1995). But
there are also a small minority of primal peoples who
appear to have had a high level of warfare, social
inequality, and male domination from the beginning.
In the Americas, there were three main areas where this
was the case: the North-West Pacific, Caribbean
MesoAmerica (where the Aztecs and the Maya lived),
and Peru (where the Incas lived) (DeMeo, 1998). The
reasons for this may have been environmental, or perhaps, as DeMeo (1998) suggests, they were due to a
prehistoric migration of groups who were already warlike and socially stratified from Japan and China. In
Africa mild warfare, social inequality, and patriarchy
spread as a result of the ancient migrations of Bantuspeaking peoples from the southern edge of the Sahara
desert (DeMeo, 1998).
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